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THE HIGH COST OF DYING IN RUSSIA
I. INTRODUcTION
Life is dangerous in Russia. Only fifty-four percent of Rus-
sians now sixteen years old will live to be sixty, a rate worse than in
1897.1 Not only are accidents the second leading cause of death,
but a 1995 Russian Government study revealed that a Russian is
five times more likely to die in an accident than an American.
2
Each year, deaths outnumber births by 600,000, and the average
man's life expectancy is only fifty-nine years.
3
Prior to 1994, Russian survivors could not recover lost wages
when victims were negligently killed.4 Survivors could only re-
cover damages resulting directly from death, such as burial and fu-
neral expenses.
5
In an attempt to liberalize damage awards, the Russian
Duma6 amended its wrongful death statute in 1996- to allow survi-
vors to recover the decedent's lost wages. 7 This law, because of its
1. See Richard C. Paddock, A Russian Ambulance is Seldom Chased, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 1997, at Al.
2. See id
3. See id
4. See Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Fed-
eration No. 3 of April 28, 1994 on the Judicial Practice in Cases of Compensation for the
Damage Inflicted by Injury to Health, translated in ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA (Garant
1997 Doc. 10001178), available in LEXIS Intlaw Library, RF Law File [hereinafter Rus-
sian Resolution No. 3]. A common point of view in Russia is to accept accidents as fate
and not to try and rationalize a cause for the accident. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
"In Russia, an average person would not think of suing .... It's your own fault [if there is
an accident]." Id.
5. A statute enacted by the Russian Duma in 1994 was the first to provide for dam-
ages other than burial expenses, including a provision for lost future wages when the
breadwinner of a family is killed. See GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RE [GK RF] ch. 40, art.
459 (Russ.), translated in Economic Law of Russia (Garant 1997 Doc. 10080200), avail-
able in Westlaw; see also Paddock, supra note 1. In the case of Lyudmila Rolshchikova,
the attorney believed that Rolshchikova's 22 year old daughter would be fortunate to
merely recover these costs, because she is beyond the age of dependence. See id.; see also
KONSTITUTSIIA RF [Constitution] [KONST. RF] art. 11, § 1 (1993) (Russ.).
6. The Duma is the Russian Federation Parliament. See KONST. RE art. 11, § 1
(1993).
7. See Russian Resolution No. 3, available in LEXIS Intlaw Library, RE Law File
The wrongful death action is contained within a body of laws which is generally concerned
with work-related injuries, but there is also a provision for damages when the victim does
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narrow scope, has not motivated the Russian industry to imple-
ment safety measures and prevent needless deaths. 8 With a few
narrow exceptions, only dependent family members are allowed to
recover lost wages. 9 As a result, tortfeasors only compensate sur-
vivors who have no other means of support.10
This Comment considers damages under the Russian wrong-
ful death statute and recommends the extension of lost wage re-
covery to all survivors, regardless of their dependency status. In
this way, Russian compensatory damages would be comparable to
the U.S. system. n Russia should not, however, adopt a U.S.-style
punitive damage system in wrongful death actions. Punitive dam-
ages are not needed to deter negligent behavior in Russia, and
their impact on the Russian economy would be severe.
Part II briefly describes the Russian legal system and explains
why reform is difficult. Part III discusses the 1996 Amendment to
the Russian wrongful death statute and the possible objectives
behind it. Part IV discusses the policy considerations supporting
tort reform in Russia and how this Comment's proposed damage
system would rectify existing problems. Part V gives a brief over-
view of the U.S. system of damage allotments in wrongful death
actions, while Part VI recommends that Russia adopt a U.S.-style
lost wage provision to compensate all survivors.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Judges and Lawyers in Russia
There is little financial incentive in Russia for either judges or
lawyers to improve the legal system. 12 Judges are underpaid, 13
not maintain a work relationship with the defendant-tortfeasor. See id The Russian
Resolution of April 28, 1994 was amended in 1996 to include damages to children who
attained the age of majority but were still pursuing their education. See GK RF ch. 40,
art. 459, §1. Prior to this amendment, the 1994 statute only allowed recovery of lost fu-
ture wages when the decedent was killed on the job. See Russian Resolution No. 3, supra
note 4.
8. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
9. The survivors must also be elderly, disabled or under eighteen to recover. See
GK RF ch. 40, art. 459, § 1.
10. See id.
11. See generally 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death §§ 255-63 (1988).
12. See generally William Patrick Murphy, Jr., The Russian Courts of General Juris-
diction: In Crisis, Undergoing Reform, or Both? (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative. Law Journal). Neither
judges nor lawyers are paid sufficiently in Russia. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
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earning only between $1800 and $2800 (U.S.) per year. Federal
judges are the highest paid, while the municipal judges who usually
decide tort cases are not only the lowest paid but also carry the
heaviest case loads.
14
Lawyers are also undercompensated. 15 The highest paid at-
torneys work in international business development within Rus-
sia. 16 Lawyers do not use the contingent fee system in Russia be-
cause damage awards are typically too small to cover legal fees
even without subtracting the contingency fee. 17 Partly due to
these low damage awards, there are only 26,000 lawyers in Rus-
sia,18 about two-thirds the number currently practicing in Los An-
geles County alone. 19
This lack of financial incentive draws the most gifted lawyers
Judges frequently go without pay during government shutdowns. See Murphy supra, at 3.
Lawyers cannot capitalize on fees because in present economic conditions, few Russians
can afford lawyers. In addition, contingent fees are impractical because damage awards
are typically low. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9. Although other incentives exist for
improving the legal system, Russian lawyers first need financial stability to establish
practices and effectively serve clients. See id
13. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 3. The judicial salary figures can be misleading be-
cause Russian judges also receive housing and other benefits in addition to merit in-
creases. The salaries remain comparatively low, however, and lawsuits filed for the pay-
ment of wages more than tripled in 1996. See id Russian President Boris Yeltsin enacted
a presidential decree on January 25, 1997, that would increase judicial salaries by 65%,
but Russia's current economic crisis raises serious doubts whether the decree can be im-
plemented in the near future. See id It does not seem possible that judges can receive
such a significant pay raise when the government cannot afford to pay the present meager
salaries. See id.
14. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 3. Caseloads have decreased by about five percent,
however. See id. This does not reflect a reduction in tort cases but rather results from
fewer divorces, bankruptcies, and housing disputes. See id
15. See id
16. See id. International business lawyers receive the highest salaries in Russia be-
cause they are retained mostly by foreign corporations who can afford to pay larger re-
tainers in exchange for the opportunity to do business in Russia. This arrangement may
reflect the domestic industry's inability to successfully tap the market's potential. See
Merton J. Peck, Russian Privatization: What Basis Does it Provide for a Market Econ-
omy?, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21,27 (1995).
17. As a result, plaintiffs cannot afford legal fees. Furthermore, difficult ethical di-
lemmas arise from charging contingency fees when plaintiffs already receive insufficient
awards.
18. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9. The number of lawyers in Russia is low be-
cause there are not enough clients who can afford to pay attorney fees, and the likelihood
of success for tort plaintiffs is low. See idt
19. See id. In comparison, the United States has nearly a million lawyers, more than
38 times as many as Russia. See id
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away from the courtroom and into transactional law.20 As a result,
legal reform is slow because cases that reach litigation are often
tried by inexperienced or less skilled attorneys who are less likely
to argue effectively for changes in the law.21 Moreover, the most
talented attorneys have no financial incentive to become judges
because of the low pay.22
B. The Russian Judicial System
The Russian judicial system consists of four distinct levels of
courts.23 The Courts of General Jurisdiction ordinarily decide tort
cases and are roughly equivalent to U.S. municipal courts.24 There
is also a military court, a commercial court, and a constitutional
court.
25
C. Legal Research in Russia is Difficult and Time-Consuming
A major impediment to justice in Russia is that many statutes,
including those establishing negligence causes of action, are ex-
tremely difficult to find.2 6 The tools that U.S. lawyers typically use
to find legal materials, such as computer databases and legal texts
are not available in Russia. 27
Russian laws prior to 1994 are not codified and are stored
only in central urban locations.28 Russian laws are ostensibly
available to the public,2 9 but even experienced lawyers have diffi-
culty finding applicable statutes, while persons without legal
training are at a great disadvantage. 30
20. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 4.
21. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9. In the case of Lyudmila Rolshchikova, who
was crushed by falling ice, the matter was researched and tried by a law student named
Tatiana Dmitriyeva. See id. Although Dmitriyeva was not incompetent, she may have
lacked the necessary experience to represent her client most effectively. See id. Pre-
sumably, the plaintiff did not have the means to hire an experienced lawyer, or could not
find one to take the case. See id.
22. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 3.
23. See id. at 3.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9. Only the most recent codes to take effect since
the collapse of the Soviet Empire are codified. See generally GK RF (Russ.).
27. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
28. See id. The Russian Constitution does require statutes to be published, however.
See KONST. RF ch. 1, art. 15(3), § 1 (1993).
29. See KONST. RF ch. 1, art. 15(3), § 1 (1993).
30. See Paddock, supra note 1.
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The lack of accessibility impedes the litigation process by de-
terring those who wish to enforce their legal rights. It also in-
creases attorney fees because of the inordinate time spent re-
searching.
31
The case of Lyudmila Rolshchikova, a single mother of two
who was killed by a desktop-sized sheet of ice that slid off a build-
ing, illustrates the inefficiency of the Russian legal system. 32 A
second-year law student represented her children in the wrongful
death action against the government. 33 It took the student four
months to locate the negligence statute in the municipal archive,
which provided that the failure of government maintenance work-
ers to remove ice from buildings constitutes negligence. 34 The
childrens' case is still pending at this time.
35
III. THE 1996 AMENDMENTS TO THE RUSSIAN
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
The Constitution of the Russian Federation articulates the
policy considerations on which the Russian tort system is based.
36
Primarily, the tort system should compensate negligence victims
and their survivors. 37 It should also discourage future negligence
by punishing tortfeasors financially, thereby providing financial in-
centives to improve existing technology.38 Judgments against de-
31. Considered with other factors described earlier, such as the lack of a contingent
fee system, one can appreciate that litigation in Russia is extremely difficult.
32. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9. These types of situations are not uncommon in
Russia given the harsh winters. See id
33. See id
34. Even a finding of liability does not guarantee a substantial damage award in a
wrongful death case. See id Also, in Russia as in the United States, a finding of criminal
liability strengthens a plaintiff's case in a subsequent civil action. In the past, however, a
finding of criminal liability was a prerequisite for civil liability under the Soviet System.
The remnants of this system still linger in Russia, and a civil case is often preceded by a
criminal case. In the action of Lyudmila Rolshchikova there were no criminal charges
filed against the defendants, making the case more difficult to prove. See id.
35. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
36. The Russian Constitution provides that "[tihe rights of persons who have sus-
tained harm from crimes and abuses of power shall be protected by the law. The state
shall guarantee the victims access to justice and compensation for damage." KONST. RF
ch. 2, art. 52, § 1 (1993). "Everyone shall have the right to compensation by the state for
the damage caused by unlawful actions or inaction of state organs, or their officials." Id
art. 53.
37. See FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (1933).
38. See David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781,
804-05. Punitive damages originated in England, where their purpose was to punish those
1998]
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fendants in wrongful death actions motivate businesses to devise
safer practices to avoid future liability.
Because the burden of proof in a civil system is lower than in
criminal trials and civil law imposes only financial penalties, civil
sanctions must be severe to deter effectively.39 To deter future
tortious actions, monetary sanctions must at minimum outweigh
the benefits of maintaining the status quo.40
Russian courts do not award punitive damages to plaintiffs in
wrongful death cases.41 There are no exceptions to this rule, nor
does the Russian Civil Code state the policy reasons for it.42 It
likely exists because large punitive damage awards would stifle the
Russian economy.43
Punitive damages are not necessary to achieve deterrence and
could result in over-deterrence, bankrupting both private and gov-
ernmental organizations in the process. Therefore, the Duma is
justifiably apprehensive of legislation that may harm the growth of
business.44
IV. CONTINUED REFORM OF RUssIA's
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
A. Life is Dangerous in Russia
Russia's current economic conditions necessitate a revised
approach toward civil recovery. Because of the political and social
upheaval accompanying the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
Russian economy has been stagnant, resulting in poorly main-
who were beyond the criminal law's reach. See id. at 794.
39. See id. at 805.
40. See id. at 797.
41. See generally GK RF (Russ.). Russia's Code provides for moral damages (those
which include mental pain and suffering) but no provision exists for punitive damages in
negligence cases involving death, even if the defendant is a governmental entity. See id.
42. See generally GK RF (Russ.).
43. See generally George L. Bustin & Andrei V. Krylov, Product Liability in Emerg-
ing Markets: The Russian Model, 9 INT'L L. PRAc. 20 (1996). Product liability law in
Russia does not provide for punitive damages either, despite the fact that many potential
defendants are foreign corporations with deep pockets. See id. at 21. This is a strong
statement about the aversion of Russian law to punitive damages.
44. See Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Require-
ments and Prospects for Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 67 (1995). McGrory asserts that much of the Russian economy
exists "underground" and beyond the reach of regulation. See id. at 90. He believes this
further weakens the legitimate economy. See id.
[Vol. 20:569
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tained roads, public transportation systems and public utilities.
45
In 1995, passengers boarding Russian trolleys were electro-
cuted because corroded power cables allowed electricity to flow
through the hand rails.46 Rather than repair the cables, the Rus-
sian government advised citizens to jump on and off the trains,
landing on both feet, to avoid electrocution.47 In another instance,
a manhole adjacent to a playground was left uncovered by street
workers and a five year-old boy fell into it and drowned.48 In June
of 1997, bribed Russian inspectors approved a shipment of boot-
legged vodka that killed twenty-two people who drank it.
49
Severe winters compound Russia's problems. Ice accumu-
lated on buildings must be removed to prevent it from falling on
passers-by, as it did in the case of Lyudmila Rolshchikova. To
melt ice, authorities spread a toxic mixture of chloride salt on the
streets that corrodes underground power lines and pollutes ground
water. 50
This state of affairs is not limited to the public sector; private
enterprise is similarly unmaintained. 51 Automobiles often stall in
high-speed traffic lanes, causing fatal collisions.52 Construction
sites are not properly safeguarded and falling debris rains down on
sidewalks.53 Russia is a dangerous place to live, and its citizens are
not financially protected from the consequences of frequent fatal
accidents.
45. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9. The overall state of Russian public mainte-
nance is atrocious, and is punctuated by the Russian Street Authority spreading toxic
road salt to melt ice. See id. In one incident, a Russian utility erroneously connected a
high pressure gas line to a residential line, causing fifteen homes to explode in a small
village in the north. See id Also, tap water provided by the Russian utility company is
frequently contaminated, causing widespread illness and occasionally death. See id. In
1997 in just one month, 394 people contracted hepatitis from municipal tap water. See id.
46. See id There is evidence that the corrosion of the power cables did not occur due
to age or wear but rather as a result of the road salt that the Russian Transportation
Authority uses to melt ice. See id.
47. See id
48. See Howard Witt, Street Tells Stories of Chaos in Moscow, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Mar. 6, 1994, at A27. This is merely one example of the sort of outrageous
negligence which would warrant an award of punitive damages under an American-style
damage system. See infra Part VI.
49. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
50. See id
51. See id This toxic mixture was the likely cause of the trolley electrocutions be-
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B. Russian Insurance is Scarce and Expensive
One reason to protect Russian citizens from catastrophic
death is the unavailability of private insurance.54 Russians find li-
ability and life insurance difficult to obtain, and few individuals
can afford the premiums. 55 Because the Russian government be-
gan with the vestiges of the Communist national insurance system,
there are few statutory provisions regulating private insurance.
56
New legislation is often more vague and difficult to interpret
than the laws it was meant to clarify.57 Although there are many
new private insurers willing to insure policyholders, they often
charge exorbitant premiums or become insolvent.58 As a result,
few Russians carry insurance.59
Russian companies and Russian drivers are generally unin-
sured.60 Moreover, most Russians do not have life insurance.61
This emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive system of tort
compensation. Russian children whose mothers are negligently
killed cannot recuperate the costs of deadly accidents except
through the legal system. Consequently, such accidents may leave
behind a financially helpless family. Until the Russian economy
can support a better private insurance system, Russian law must
provide a more complete remedy.
C. Under the Russian Wrongful Death Statute a Survivor Must Be
Under Eighteen, Elderly, or Disabled to Recover
Russian law allows adequate compensatory damages to survi-
vors only when they are incapable of supporting themselves.62 The
survivors must be minors, elderly, or disabled to receive this in-
54. See Christopher A. Thompson, Insuring a Brighter Future: The Emerging System
of Russian Insurance Law, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 863, 867 (1997). "Given the current state
of the insurance industry, the introduction of additional legislation will be crucial to Rus-
sia's economic development." Id at 866.
55. See id. at 867.
56. See id at 867, 871.
57. See hi.
58. See i. The newly formed insurance companies suffered from gross undercapi-
talization and widespread concerns regarding the financial stability of these companies
developed. The government, however, reacted slowly. See id. at 866, 876.
59. See Thompson, supra note 54, at 911. The premiums collected by Russian insur-
ers totaled less than $1 billion dollars in 1996. See id. In the United States, by compari-
son, the total was about $254 billion dollars. See id.
60. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
61. See id.




The harsh reality of this system is that a surviving spouse can
be precluded from recovery merely because she was employed
prior to her husband's death. Alternatively, she may be unable to
find work for reasons not related to physical infirmity or age, but
rather because of lack of job skills or a depressed economy. Un-
less she was completely dependent upon her husband, she can only
recover burial expenses.64
Prior to the 1996 amendment, a surviving child over eighteen
years old was ineligible for compensation, even if the child was at-
tending school at the time of the accident. 65 Notably, there is no
exception to the new statute that allows recovery for a surviving
student. 66
As a matter of public policy, a primary goal of any tort system
should be to make victims and their families economically whole
following a loss. 67 The current Russian system does not make tort
victims whole, but only reimburses immediate costs. 68 Russia
should strive to provide long term compensation for victims to
spare Russian citizens costs that should be borne by tortfeasors.
Compensating survivors and encouraging the growth of busi-
ness need not be mutually exclusive goals. Ensuring the financial
stability of plaintiffs has broad positive effects on the economy.
69
Punitive damages would exacerbate economic downturns by pass-






67. See generally 22A AM. JUR. 2d Death §§ 24-32 (1988).
68. Compensation for financial losses in Russia usually includes only the expenses
immediately incurred following the death of a plaintiff-decedent, such as funeral and
burial expenses. See Paddock, supra note 1, at Al. These were the only damages
awarded prior to the 1994 amendment to the wrongful death statute. See Russian Reso-
lution No. 3, available in LEXIS Intlaw Library, RF Law File. When lost wages are
awarded, they are awarded only to relatives unable to earn a livelihood. Thus, to win lost
wages, a plaintiff must not only show she deserves damages, but also that there is a finan-
cial need for those damages. See GK RF § 1, chap. 40, art. 459.
69. See generally Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency
in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (1987).
70. See Andrea K. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alternative Punitive Damages Sanc-
tion, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 341,354 (1996).
19981
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V. THE U.S. SYSTEM OF DAMAGE AWARDS
A. Public Policy Considerations of the U.S. System May Benefit
the Russian System
In the United States, survivors can recover decedents' lost
wages regardless of the age or physical condition of the survivors.
71
This is consistent with the U.S. policy of ensuring financial whole-
ness regardless of the plaintiffs' reliance on the decedent. 72 The
U.S. system also provides compensation for emotional loss and
other intangible losses in wrongful death cases.73
B. The U.S. System and Its Policy Bases
The U.S. tort system awards punitive damages when the vio-
lation of the plaintiff's rights is particularly egregious. 74 The pur-
pose of punitive damage awards has long been debated in Ameri-
can law; it has been described as a combination of compensation,
deterrence and retribution rationales. 75 To determine the useful-
ness of punitive damages in Russia, their purpose and utility in the
United States must first be examined.76
1. Specific and General Deterrence
In the United States, punitive damage awards deter both spe-
cifically and generally.77 Because U.S. business and industry is
generally able to pay these large judgments, the policy of deter-
71. See 22A AM. JUR. 2d Torts §§ 89-157 (1988).
72. See generally id
73. See id.
74. Note that states are split on the award of punitive damages in wrongful death ac-
tions, indicating the importance and divisiveness of the issue. California does not allow
punitive damages in wrongful death actions. See Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640,
167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980). Pennsylvania allows punitive damages for wrongful death. See
Wang v. Marziani, 885 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). New York also allows for punitive
damages in wrongful death. See Rimoldi v. Schanzer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1989).
75. See Partlett, supra note 38, at 792.
76. Commentator Dorsey Ellis has proposed seven reasons for awarding punitive
damages: (1) the punishment of the defendant; (2) the deterrence of the particular de-
fendant (specific deterrence); (3) the deterrence of others (general deterrence); (4) the
preservation of the peace; (5) the inducement of law enforcement by private citizens; (6)
the compensation of the victim for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) the payment
of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982).
77. See Partlett, supra note 38, at 792. Specific deterrence refers to deterring tortfea-
sorg who have already been found liable whereas general deterrence refers to deterring
potential tortfeasors. See id.
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rence results in a net long-term financial gain.78
Commentators disagree, however, on whether negligence,
which is by definition unintentional, can be deterred at all.79 This
argument is weak when applied to individuals,80 but it becomes
more viable when the level of individual culpability rises to reck-
lessness. 8
1
In the case of corporations,82 the argument for deterrence is
more compelling. 83 The negligence of businesses is commonly the
result of company policy, and is therefore deterrable. While the
individual person may not consciously choose to be negligent, a
corporation will often follow certain procedures that are likely to
result in negligent conduct.
The following examples illustrate this point. In a common
case of individual negligence, a distracted driver rear-ends another
car. This may be caused by the driver's fatigue, poor concentra-
tion, old age, or other distractions. The driver is aware that paying
attention to the road is beneficial to him as well as to others, yet he
negligently fails to do so.
Next, reconsider the case of Lyudmila Rolshchikova, who was
killed by falling ice. The city's failure to remove the ice was negli-
gent, but it was likely caused by a conscious decision of the city's
public works department. 84 Removing the ice may have been too
costly because of a lack of manpower or equipment. The city
should have known that failing to remove the accumulated ice was
78. This is the fundamental tenet of the public policy underlying a tort system. See id
Although the amounts of the judgments appear to be high, industry is financially coerced
into developing more efficient business practices and means of production which result in
lower consumer costs. In addition, as business becomes safer, fewer people are injured,
resulting in a long-term net gain in resources.
79. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
80. In other words, corporate negligence is more easily deterrable than individual
negligence.
81. At the point when an individual gives conscious thought and recognition to a
known danger and yet does nothing to avoid its occurrence, the individual could be suc-
cessfully deterred if the negative consequences of that action outweigh any benefits that
the would-be tortfeasor would accrue from performing the act. Prior to the moment when
conscious thought drives the tortious behavior, the actor does not perform any cost-
benefit analysis of his actions and therefore cannot be successfully deterred. See generally
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115
(1993).
82. Fictitious individuals.
83. See Curcio, supra note 70, at 347.
84. See id.
1998] 579
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dangerous. Knowing that it would cost less to pay damages than to
remove the ice, the city made a conscious decision not to act.
The behavior of the city public works department is not reck-
less because it did not consciously disregard a known danger.85
The city should have known of the danger.86 Although the city's
culpability approached recklessness, the possibility of injury was
not reasonably certain, making its behavior merely negligent.87
While the negligent behavior of the individual driver cannot
be deterred, the negligence of the public works department is de-
terrable. 88 If the department knows that the price of inaction will
exceed the cost of action,89 it will be motivated to avoid such pen-
alties.
Under the current Russian system, not only will the depart-
ment undercompensate the victims, a life will also be lost. This
demonstrates why the goal of deterrence is more important than
the goal of compensation. If deterrence is successfully imple-
mented as a policy, it will not only compensate the victims more
efficiently, but also prevent accidents and save lives.90
2. Punitive Damages as Compensation for
Otherwise Non-Compensable Losses
One commentator contends that punitive damages exist to
compensate survivors for intangible and otherwise uncompensable
losses.91 He reasons that although the courts award explicit dam-
ages for losses that are difficult to quantify,92 punitive damage
85. See 57A AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 262 (1988).
86. See id. While negligence is the failure to use the care that a reasonable person
under the same or similar circumstances would use, recklessness is the failure to act when
the actor consciously realizes that an injury is probable. See id.
87. See Curcio, supra note 70, at 341.
88. See id.
89. The cost of action would include the costs of hiring additional maintenance work-
ers and possibly acquiring more equipment. One might argue that the money is not avail-
able for such expenditures; but the cost of judgments would be more expensive. Judg-
ments would be set at a level that tortfeasors could afford so that the plaintiffs would be
able to collect.
90. See id.
91. This argument is unpersuasive in the United States because the system of torts in
this country provides for virtually every describable form of damages, including emotional
distress, loss of consortium, etc. The purpose of punitive damages in the United States is
to punish the defendant and to provide general and specific deterrence. See generally
22A AM. JUR. 2d Death (1988).
92. An example of this would be loss of consortium or mental suffering.
[Vol. 20:569580
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awards compensate survivors for costs that are not allowed by
law.93
This argument does not explain the existence of punitive
damages in the United States. U.S. courts award damages for pain
and suffering that cover any possible psychological injuries that
plaintiffs may suffer.94
Attorneys have also been credited for increasing both the oc-
currence and amount of punitive damage awards because they are
motivated to argue for them when working on contingency. 95 Al-
though the historical reasons for punitive damages are debatable,
they exist in the United States today both as punishment and de-
terrent.96
3. Do Punitive Damages Offend the Ideology of Tort Law?
Commentators have argued that punitive damages are incon-
sistent with the U.S. justice system. 97 First, punitive damages in-
ject punishment, a characteristic inherent in criminal law, into the
civil system.98 Civil law generally exists to compensate victims of
non-criminal conduct, not to punish wrongdoers. 99
Second, punitive damages can leave defendants unable to pay
future judgments to other equally deserving plaintiffs. 100 If a cor-
porate defendant injures one person, other injured persons won't
be able to recover because the first plaintiff will have depleted the
funds. Subsequent plaintiffs have an equally compelling right to
compensation, but they effectively lose that right by being beaten
to the courthouse. 101
One of the arguments against punitive damages, however, is
also a strong argument in their favor: punitive damages allow civil
law to punish behavior that does not merit punishment under
93. See Partlett, supra note 38, at 795.
94. See 22A AM. JUR. 2d Death §§ 234-240 (1988).
95. See Partlett, supra note 38, at 794.
96. See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1984).
97. See id.
9& See Partlett, supra note 38, at 793, 800.
99. See id at 790.
100. See generally Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones, Exemplary Damages as an
Instrument of Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L. 797
(1987).
101. See id at 798.
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criminal law.102
A simple explanation for the apparent inconsistency is that
civil law awards punitive damages because criminal law cannot. 103
That is to say, corporate or municipal defendants have the re-
sources to pay out these sometimes staggering judgments, but de-
fendants in criminal cases most often cannot.1°4 Also, punitive
damages may exist because corporate entities cannot be impris-
oned, thereby permitting the increased punishment of a defendant
who can only be sanctioned financially.
Rather than viewing civil law as intrusive on criminal law, civil
law can be viewed as complementary to it. When the two systems
operate in concert, they correct and deter more instances of inef-
ficient behavior than either system alone. 105
VI. THE CORRECr DAMAGE FORMULA FOR RUSSIA
A. Deterrence Would Not Be Furthered by Punitive Damages
Deterrence is Russia's most important goal in its struggle to
establish a system of compensation that serves public policy pur-
poses. However, the Russian economy prevents the institution of
punitive damages to achieve that end.
Punitive damages would not further general deterrence in
Russia because they could not be consistently applied or awarded
in sufficiently large amounts. Punitive damages could effect spe-
cific deterrence, 106 but would also bring the danger of over-
deterrence. 107
Punitive damages would also not effectively compensate vic-
tims for intangible or non-compensable losses. Although some
plaintiffs would benefit, many more would lose an opportunity to
collect a judgment because the Russian economy cannot support
numerous claims against business and industry.108 Future plaintiffs
would find that no one is accountable for losses sustained, and they
would remain uncompensated.




106. See generally McGrory, supra note 44.
107. See idt
108. See generally James P. Nehf, Empowering the Russian Consumer in a Market
Economy, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739 (1993).
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Justifying punitive damages as a means of awarding attorney
fees to the plaintiff likewise fails. While greater punitive damage
awards would motivate lawyers to try cases which they otherwise
would not, such awards will also financially drain Russian industry.
Plaintiffs may benefit from a few large damage awards, but even-
tually the well would run dry and leave plaintiffs and defendants
without financial resources. 109
In the case of the trolley electrocutions, it is possible that
mere compensatory damages, even to the families of the several
victims, would not be sufficient to outweigh the cost of repairing
the damaged power cables. 110 In such a case, punitive damages
might appear necessary to motivate action on the part of the gov-
ernment. Considering the number of possible plaintiffs in such a
case, however, the collective amount of mere compensatory dam-
ages rises dramatically. Compensatory damages alone in these
multiple plaintiff cases will more likely affect the defendant than in
cases with single plaintiffs.
B. Russia Should Not Adopt the U.S. System of Punitive Damages
Russia was correct in passing its lost future wages statute. It
did not go far enough, however, either in compensating victims or
deterring tortfeasors.
By limiting damage awards to survivors who are unable to
care for themselves, Russians are worse off financially by bearing
the additional burden of destitute survivors. Although families
might assume their care, those without family become burdens on
the state.111 Society bears the cost instead of the responsible party.
Tortfeasors escape with mimimal expense.
Another reason why punitive damage awards are high in the
United States is that corporations with significant capital cannot be"
deterred by smaller damage amounts. 112 Awards must be high to
inflict tangible financial punishment on the corporations. This is
not true in Russia.
The ideal solution for Russia is a middle ground between the
damages currently awarded and the sizable judgments sometimes
won by plaintiffs in the United States. This balance would consist
109. See generally McGrory, supra note 44.
110. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A1.
111. See KONST. RF art. 7, § 2 (1993). The Russian Constitution provides that the
government will care for elderly and disabled citizens. See id
112. See Demarest & Jones, supra note 100, at 822.
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of awarding lost wages to all family members who depended even
partially on the decedent, regardless of their age or health. Only
by increasing compensatory damage awards to plaintiffs can the
Russian legal system achieve all its goals: compensation, deter-
rence, and the preservation of the Russian economy.
1. Potential Effects of Judicial Activism on
Punitive Damage Awards
There are over 15,000 judges in Russia today.113 If Russia in-
stitutes punitive damage awards on a discretionary basis, damage
amounts would be inconsistent.114 This is distinct from judicial
activism, which results from a lack of cohesiveness in the judici-
ary.115
A jury system would provide increased consistency in judg-
ment amounts.116 Juries do not weigh competing considerations of
policy, but rather consider only what the instant parties deserve.
117
This suggests that similar cases will result in similar outcomes.
This is not true when a single individual, like a judge, is re-
sponsible for decisions within a single jurisdiction over a period of
time.118 Individual viewpoints tend to create jurisprudence that
differs from other jurisdictions. 119 Allowing judges to award dis-
cretionary punitive damages would result in inconsistent applica-
tion of the law, and create different results where the outcomes
should have been similar.
120
113. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 3. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed into
law a bill which would make all Russian judges federal judges. It is hoped that this will
create unity within the Russian judiciary because separatism threatens to undermine the
authority of the federal government. See id at 2.
114. There have been many signs of judicial independence among the various districts
in the past, prompting President Yeltsin to sign a bill into law unifying the Russian judi-
cial system. See id at 5. There are currently 14,650 judges sitting in the civil courts of
general jurisdiction. This represents an 8% departure from the overall size of the general
jurisdiction court system if all seats were filled. See id The mere fact that so many
benches are empty is startling evidence of the state of morale among judges throughout
the nation. They have little confidence in the federal system, and the lack of pay contrib-
utes to the difficulty of filling these posts. See id.
115. See id
116. See generally Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment Judge or Jury: Who Should Assess
Punitive Damages?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1089 (1996).
117. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Tran-
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1140 (1992).
118. See Sharkey, supra note 116, at 1089.
119. See id. at 1090.
120. See id. at 1089.
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Because of this variety of results, the goals of punitive dam-
ages would be ill-served. 121 Greater uncertainty of damage awards
and consequently lower contingent legal fees will decrease attor-
ney motivation to take cases.
122
Inconsistent verdicts also compromise the goals of general
and specific deterrence. Potential tortfeasors may be tempted to
gamble with safety if they are somewhat less likely to be punished
if caught. Defendants will be deterred to a lesser extent if the
punishment imposed is less than expected.
Finally, particular judges might consistently award lower
damage amounts than others. Plaintiffs instead of defendants will
be deterred from filing cases because of uncertain results.
C. Russia Should Not Adopt a Modified Form of Punitive
Damages Limited By a Stautory Cap
The absence of civil jury trials in Russia might favor Russia's
adoption of a system of punitive damages. 123 Russia has recently
passed legislation providing for jury trials in death penalty cases.124
Judges alone preside over civil trials, which are unaffected by this
legislation. 125
This argument is unpersuasive, however, because any level of
punitive damage awards would harm the Russian economy. With-
out juries, the Russian courts can adopt a system of punitive dam-
ages with a statutory cap that would not jeopardize the vitality of
the Russian economy. This cap could be set at a predetermined
percentage of the compensatory damages that include lost wages.
This system, although seemingly rigid in setting damage
amounts, is actually flexible because the statutory cap can be ad-
justed to account for a growing economy and the need for greater
121. See id. at 1091.
122. While the family will be better off with a small damage award than with nothing
at all, cases would have to be handled on a pro-bono basis to avoid the ethical dilemma
that would arise from deducting a contingent fee from a judgment that would be a fam-
ily's only sustenance.
123. See Concept of Judicial Reform Act, No. 1435 (1991).
124. See id The Russian law reinstates the trial by jury in criminal trials in which
death is a possible penalty. The jury consists of two members of the citizenry who occupy
a semi-permanent position in the chambers of the same judge throughout their tenure.
See id Preliminary data from Russia indicates that these two jurors are in most cases a
mere rubber stamp for the decision of the judge, who makes a recommendation that the
jury must approve. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia,
31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61, 67 (1995).
125. See Concept of Judicial Reform Act, No. 1435 (1991).
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financial incentives to deter businesses. With the statutory cap,
awards are strictly regulated and fears of arresting the develop-
ment of the economy are allayed.
This system is not as arbitrary as judge or jury punitive dam-
age awards because it allows awards to be proportional to the
amount of compensatory damages awarded. The punishment of
the defendant would correspond precisely to the amount of harm
done, and eliminate the inconsistency that is inherent in jurors and
leads to large verdicts.
126
The statutory cap fails, however, because it does not deter ei-
ther generally or specifically, and is also inherently unfair to plain-
tiffs. Punitive damages exist first and foremost to punish the de-
fendant, not to compensate the plaintiff. Therefore, the loss of a
limitless punitive damages system 127 hampers justice and benefits
negligent defendants. The plaintiffs who would be the hardest hit
by a statutory cap on punitive damages are those who have suf-
fered from the most egregious and unforgivable sorts of injuries-
those that result from the defendant's blatant disregard for the
plaintiff's rights. 128 The statutory cap is therefore a less efficient
solution than awarding no punitive damages at all.
Another fear is the inconsistent application of a discretionary
punitive damage award with a statutory cap.129 The statutory cap
suffers the same problem with judicial discretion as do any other
discretionary damages. Inconsistent application would result in a
system not far removed from the status quo, and policy goals
would be ill-served. This would further narrow the gap between
the present system and the statutory cap by reducing the amounts
of damage awards overall.
Ultimately, the strongest argument against a statutory cap on
punitive damages is simply that punitive damages are undesirable
in Russia because compensatory damages alone sufficiently deter,
punish, and preserve the integrity of the Russian economy.
126. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 117, at 1140. This is the commonly ad-
vanced explanation for why jury verdicts are higher on average than those awarded from
the bench.
127. Such a plan stands in contrast to a statutorily regulated system.
128. See Troy L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the Disadvantage&t The Discriminatory
Effects of Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1009 (1997).
129. For a discussion of judicial activism in Russia, see supra Part VI.B.1.
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D. A Solution For Russia
By awarding more comprehensive compensatory damages to
survivors regardless of their age or physical infirmities, Russia can
effectively balance its policy considerations. Lesser compensation
will negatively affect the Russian economy, not only by leaving fi-
nancially dependent persons helpless, but by leaving business and
municipal organizations without financial incentives to correct
their dangerous conduct. An amendment to the Russian Civil
Code providing for lost wage awards without exception in wrong-
ful death actions would achieve this change in the law.
Punitive damages, by contrast, would result in over-
deterrence because any sizable judgment would likely bankrupt a
defendant. They might arguably deter others from the same be-
havior, but the punishment would be too severe and detrimental to
the overall economic condition. In addition, actors may be de-
terred from useful activity because of the severity of any potential
punishment.130
The absence of punitive damages does not diminish the plain-
tiffs' potential overall compensation. Punitive damages exist not
for the purpose of compensating plaintiffs but rather to deter and
punish defendants.131
Few restraints would exist on the frequency of punitive dam-
age awards in Russia. Undoubtedly, some judges might attempt to
diminish the awards as a result of economic foresight, but judicial
activism is unlikely in Russia. 132 Judges have little incentive to act
inconsistently with statutory law because of the risk of losing their
already meager salaries.133
In addition, there are many cases where the behavior of tort-
feasors shows such a complete disregard for the safety of employ-
130. This is the classic case of over-deterrence, where the financial punishment for cer-
tain acts has been made too severe. See Curcio, supra note 70, at 347-48.
131. See Sales & Cole, supra note 96, at 1124. An original purpose of punitive damages
may have been to compensate plaintiffs for otherwise non-compensable costs, such as
mental anguish and attorney fees. Because the law provides for mental damages today
and because attorney fees are most often taken on contingency in cases where punitive
damages against manufacturers or industry are likely to be won, punitive damages no
longer serve those purposes. See id. at 1120-24.
132 See Murphy, supra note 12, at 6. Murphy suggests that there are two types are
judges in Russia: those who are corrupt and those who are lovers of justice. See id. Un-
fortunately, Murphy finds that both these kinds of judges are less than competent. Both
these problems stem from the fact that judges are underpaid, and the positions fail to at-
tract those who are most qualified. See id.
133. See id.
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ees and the public that it would be a miscarriage of justice not to
award punitive damages if they were provided for by law.
134
An excellent example is again the case of the trolley electro-
cutions, in which the government was not only aware of the dan-
gerous condition and the deaths which had resulted from it, but
even issued a warning to passengers not to touch the hand rails.
135
Although the replacement of the trolley wires would be expensive,
many aged or disabled persons who are likely to rely on public
transportation do not possess the physical agility necessary to jump
on and off trains.
The outrageousness of this act by the government would be a
plaintiff's boon in the United States. The Russian government,
however, could not afford to satisfy a large punitive judgment
without causing hardship to those who rely on government assis-
tance.136 A number of such suits could devastate the Russian fed-
eral budget.137
VII. CONCLUSION
The ideal balance between victims' rights to compensation
and the protection of Russian business is to award survivors full
economic compensation for lost wages while abstaining from pu-
nitive damages. If damages awarded exceed the amount of actual
damages incurred, the growth of the Russian economy would be
unnecessarily compromised. If plaintiffs are denied recovery be-
cause they are not aged or disabled, they are denied the right to
compensation explicit in the Russian Constitution.138
Although Russian plaintiffs might benefit from punitive dam-
age provisions, those benefits would be short-lived. The absence
of juries in civil trials will reduce the average amount of awards
and thereby protect the economy. A statutory cap on punitive
damages appears viable, but its operation would be inherently un-
just to the most deserving plaintiffs. Discretionary awards by
134. The following cases, for example, would be appropriate for the application of a
punitive damage rule: the cases of the trolley electrocutions, the case of the open man-
hole next to the playground, the public utility cases where pressurized gas caused explo-
sions, and the tainted tap water cases.
135. See Paddock, supra note 1, at A9.
136. See generally Nehf, supra note 108, at 750. Nehf advances a similar rationale re-
garding consumer protection from defective goods.
137. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 3.
138. See KONST. RF art. 53 (1993). The right to compensation exists when injuries are
caused by government action. See id.
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judges would prove too inconsistent to achieve the desired policy
outcomes of plaintiff compensation and increased attorney in-
volvement. The best solution is to award more liberal compensa-
tory damages to compensate plaintiffs, punish defendants, and
achieve deterrence.
In Russia, smaller damage amounts can effectively deter busi-
nesses that are still growing, and can thus be deterred by lower
damage amounts than U.S. companies. Consequently, the goal of
deterrence will be better served by adequate compensatory dam-
ages than by punitive damages. 13
9
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139. See Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 110 (1991).
The essential question.., in every case must be whether the amount of damages
awarded substantially serves the societal interest .... Also to be considered is
the wealth of the particular defendant; obviously, the function of deterrence will
not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with
little or no discomfort.... By the same token,. . . the function of punitive dam-
ages is not served by an award which, in light of the defendant's wealth and the
gravity of the particular act, exceeds the level necessary to properly punish and
deter.".... It follows that the wealthier the wrongdoing defendant, the larger
the award of exemplary damages need be in order to accomplish the statutory
objective."
Id (citations omitted).
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